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1. Introduction 
A child’s cognitive performance can vary considerably from one task context to the next, 
even when only small details of the task are changed. Such context dependence has given 
rise to a new way of looking at the underlying processes of children’s thinking (e.g. Smith, 
Thelen, Titzer, & McLin, 1999; Spencer, Thomas, & McClelland, 2009). Rather than 
attributing performance to a particular competence (or a lack thereof), performance is 
attributed to a synergy between the actor and environment, highly sensitive to even 
seemingly irrelevant details of the task context. Though not complete, this view makes it 
possible to map out how changes in the context could be harnessed to bring about changes 
in a child’s behavior. The current chapter looks at whether the same view can be applied to 
autism spectrum disorder (ASD). A first step in this direction is to explore the extent to 
which cognitive performance in ASD is affected by apparently irrelevant variations of the 
task context. 
Autism spectrum disorder comprises of a cluster of disorders that include Autistic Disorder 
(also known as “classic” autism), Asperger’s Syndrome, and Pervasive Developmental 
Disorder-Not Otherwise Specified (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
Though there are important differences between these sub-groups, they share a common set 
of general symptoms that arise early in a child’s life: ASD is characterized by pronounced 
social difficulties and communication impairment, along with restricted, repetitive 
behaviors or interests (APA, 2000). In particular, children often demonstrate atypical eye 
contact, a lack of verbal speech or atypical language use, odd mannerisms such as arm 
flapping, and narrow, obsessive interests (e.g.: an encyclopedic knowledge of former U.S. 
Secretaries of the Interior; Klinger, Dawson, & Renner, 2003).  
Importantly, despite extensive research into ASD, no causal factors have been isolated so 
far. For example, even though the patters of neurological activity show numerous 
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differences between typical development and ASD, no single difference appears to capture 
the disorder (for a review see Fein, 2011). And even though ASD appears to have a strong 
genetic component, genome variations appear diffuse (e.g., Devlin & Scherer, 2012). This 
raises the possibility that the disorder is not reducible to a static causal factor that can 
differentiate between typical development and ASD. Instead, the disorder might be the 
result of complex interdependence among multiple factors that change each other’s effect as 
they interact over time. Take for example, the language impairments documented in ASD. 
Rather than being attributed to a stable factor (language-specific, neurological, genetic, or 
otherwise), these behaviors might have their origin in virtually undetectably minimal 
discrepancies in how the perceptual system combines information into higher-order 
patterns. The discrepancy from typical development might be minimal at first, but then get 
amplified by a variety of child-internal, environmental, and social factors (e.g., a difficulty 
detecting higher-order patterns, a low tolerance for over-stimulation, the hierarchical order 
inherent in a language, a disrupted communication synchrony between child and caregiver, 
etc). The coming-together of environmental factors further intensify the initially minimal 
difference in perceptual processes – which then in turn amplify environmental and social 
factors. In other words, what may start out as a barely noticeable difference in how 
information is integrated might enter a cycle of forces that amplify each other’s effect over 
time, an interdependence that heralds a major departure from typical development.  
The view that ASD behavior is the result of interdependent factors that amplify each other’s 
effects over time is a stark departure from the view that overt behavior is reducible to a 
stable factor that marks autism. And while there is no conclusive evidence to support the 
former view, there is nevertheless strong support in the developmental literature of ASD. 
First, it is difficult to predict the developmental trajectories of individual children (for a 
review, see Seltzer, Shattuck, Abbeduto & Greenberg, 2004). For example, while overall 
language abilities can improve over time (Sigman & McGovern, 2005), various atypicalities 
sometimes remain, including echolalia or fixations on various topics of interest (Lord, Rici, 
& Pickles, 2004). Some children may even exhibit an increase in general symptom severity 
over time (e.g., Nordin & Gillberg, 1998).  
Second, developmental patterns tracked over time sometimes show a non-linear trajectory. 
For example, differences in social behavior (e.g. eye contact, visual tracking, visual 
disengagement, imitation, social interest, and sensory-motor behaviors), apparent at 12 
months of age, are missing in younger children (Zwaigenbaum et al., 2005; Bryson , Brian, 
Roberts, Szatmari, Rombough, & McDermott 2007). And while 6-month-old infants with a 
high risk of autism show less frontal Gamma power than low-risk children, this difference is 
negligible when infants are 24 months old (Keehn, Luyster, Vogel-Farley, Tager-Flusberg & 
Nelson, 2012). Explaining such non-linear trajectories under the reductionist viewpoint 
would require an additional assumption, namely that the isolated causal factor comes online 
at a certain point in time. These trajectories imply instead that the disorder has to be 
attributed to complex interactions among factors that change in nature over time.  
The interdependence view on ASD has strong implications for how to go about studying the 
source of this disorder and its treatment. Rather than looking for black-and-white 
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differences between ASD and typical development, and interdependence view advocates 
the study of trajectories, the stability of trajectories, and how stable cycles can be perturbed. 
Furthermore, an interdependence view implies that even small changes in the context can 
potentially have a large effect on behavioral outcomes. In the remainder of the chapter, we 
review performance variability of already published research to describe such context 
dependence in cognitive tasks. As such, this review differs from already existing reviews 
(e.g., Klinger, Dawson, & Renner, 2003; Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007) in one crucial way. 
Rather than emphasizing consistencies in findings to promote the idea of a stable difference 
in ASD (and discussing conflicting findings to undermine one over another reductionist 
ASD theory), our goal is to highlight context effects detected in ASD research.  
The chapter is organized as follows: we will first highlight some findings in pattern 
perception, a large research field centered on the idea of the so-called weak central 
coherence (cf., Frith, 1989). We will then turn to findings related to learning, focusing 
specifically on learning of higher-order patterns and statistical information in sequences. 
Next, we will discuss ASD research on executive functioning, the child’s ability to control 
their actions to achieve a certain outcome. Finally, we will turn to research on social 
reasoning, discussing findings in joint attention and theory of mind.  
2. Perception 
Perceiving meaningful configurations in the array of ever-changing information (visual or 
otherwise) requires the mind to combine separate bursts of sensation into an organized unit 
of perception. The mind has to detect or impose coherence (cf., Thagard, 1989) For example, 
in order to perceive a painting, the mind has to ignore the individual pixels of color and 
detect the higher-order organization of objects and scenes. The possible patterns of 
organization are nested hierarchically, ranging from a very local organization (e.g., an 
individual object in the painting) to a more global organization (e.g., the theme of the 
painting). The ability to detect patterns of organization at various levels of abstraction is 
commonly studied under the framework of local versus global perception, with the central 
question pertaining to the degree to which local and global perception interfere with one 
another (cf. e.g., Baylis & Driver, 1993; Herrmann & Bosch, 2001; Humphreys, Olson, 
Romani, & Riddoch, 1996; Kahneman & Henik, 1981; Kahneman & Treisman, 1984; Kimchi, 
1992; Kramer & Jacobson, 1991; Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch, 2002; Moore & Egeth, 1997; 
Pellicano & Rhodes, 2003).  
An essential difference between ASD and typical development is the degree to which the 
perception of global order interferes with the perception of local order. Rather than 
exhibiting a bias towards coherence, perception of individuals with ASD is typically 
characterized by what is known as weak central coherence. Best example of this difference 
was established with the classical Navon task, a task in which stimuli consist of many small 
letters configured in the arrangement of a large letter (cf., Navon, 1977). In typical 
development, results show a distinct interference of large letters on the perception of small 
letters, both in children (Ozonoff Strayer, McMahon & Filloux 1994; Plaisted, Swettenham, 
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and Rees, 1999) and in adults (Fagot & Deruelle, 1997; Navon, 1977). In particular, when 
participants are asked to focus on small letters, reaction time is longer for trials in which 
large and small letters differ than on trials in which large and small letters match. This 
global interference is non-detectable in participants with ASD: They perform equally fast in 
both letter-mismatch trials and letter-match trials – and that with high accuracy (e.g. 
Mottron, Burack, Stauder, & Robaey, 1999; Plaisted et al., 1999).  
Another example of weak central coherences in ASD comes from face-perception tasks. The 
identity of a face is defined not only by its individual parts (e.g., nose, eyes, mouth), but also 
by the holistic configuration of these parts, something that appears to be disrupted when 
faces are presented upside down. For typically developing children, recognition accuracy 
decreases when faces are presented upside down, compared to trials in which faces are 
presented upright (Mondloch, Le Grand, & Maurer, 2002). In contrast, children with ASD do 
not perform differently as a function of face orientation (Langdell, 1978; Tantam, Monaghan, 
Nicholson, & Stirling, 1989). Along the same lines, participants with ASD could classify 
faces better when local rather than global features were exaggerated (through the use of a 
high-pass vs. low-pass filter; Deruelle, Rondan, Salle-Collemiche, Bastard-Rosset, & Da 
Fonséca, 2008). The inverse pattern of results was obtained for typically developing 
children.  
A final example of preferential local focus comes from research involving auditory 
perception (Foxton Stewart, Barnard, Rodgers, Young, O‘Brien, & Griffiths 2003). Stimuli 
were 5-tone sequences that varied in specific tones, pattern of switch in pitch direction (e.g., 
a down sequence was followed by up sequence), and timing of the switch. In the crucial task 
(a global-interference condition), participants had to focus on only one of these features, 
ignoring changes in the other features. In particular, they had to decide on whether two 
sequences match in the patterns of switch, ignoring differences in specific tones or 
differences in timing. Result show superior performance for participants with ASD than 
matched controls. Vice versa, when sequences differed only in specific tones (the patterns 
and timing of the sequences being identical), ASD performance matched that of control 
participants (see also Mottron, Peretz & Menard, 2000). Further evidence for enhanced local 
processing of auditory information comes from the finding that individuals with ASD can 
label isolated tones better than TD controls and are more likely to have perfect pitch, 
meaning that they can replicate or identify individual musical tones without assistance 
(Bonnel, Mottron, Peretz, Trudel, Gallun, & Bonnel 2003; Heaton, Hermelin, & Pring, 1998).  
In broad strokes, while typical development is characterized by a bias towards perceiving 
higher-order Gestalts over perceiving an isolated detail, this bias is thought to be missing or 
at least less prevalent in ASD (for reviews, see Happé, 2000; Happé & Booth, 2008; Happé & 
Frith, 2006). However, even though research generally supports the idea of a weak bias 
towards higher-order Gestalt in ASD, there are some interesting exceptions. For example, 
when individuals with ASD are told to look at relevant information in face processing tasks, 
they perform in a similar way to typically developing children (Lopez, Donnelly, Hadwin, & 
Leekam, 2004). The task was to determine which of two test items matched with a target 
face. In configuration trials, the test items were faces, one of which always matched the 
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target, while the other one differed in a single feature. And on feature trials, the test items 
were individual features (e.g., eyes), one of which match the respective feature of the target. 
Critically, participants were sometimes provided with a cue indicating on which feature to 
focus. For example, they were told “look at the eyes.” In cued configuration trials, the cue 
focused attention to the mismatched feature. On feature trials, it focused attention to the 
matching feature. The typically developing group demonstrated superior performance on 
configuration trials, compared to feature trials, regardless of cueing. The ASD group, in 
contrast, demonstrated a configural advantage only on cued trials, but not in un-cued trials. 
A similar effect of instruction was found when the task was to read sentences that contained 
homographs (words that have the same spelling are a pronounced differently, depending on 
the context of a sentence). As one would predict from a weak-central-coherence assumption, 
individuals with ASD are less likely than typically developing individuals to use the context 
of a sentence to disambiguate homographs (Frith & Snowling, 1983; Happé, 1997; Jolliffe & 
Baron-Cohen, 1999; Lopez & Leekam, 2003). For example, when asked to read aloud a 
sentence containing the homograph “tear”, participants with ASD are less likely to take the 
sentence context into account when deciding on how to pronounce the word. However, this 
pattern of performance changes dramatically when attention is explicitly directed to the 
homographs (Snowling & Frith, 1986). That is, when explicitly told to look for homographs, 
their use of proper pronunciation approaches that of typically developing individuals.  
Variations in instruction also affect ASD performance on tasks involving optical illusions, 
another area that attests to Gestalt interference in typical development. Typically, the task is 
to focus on a local piece of information and ignore the embedding context. For example, in 
the Muller-Lyer illusion, the task is to compare the length of the two lines, ignoring the 
arrows on each end of the lines. Findings show that typically developing participants are 
strongly affected by the embedded context, succumbing to the illusion to the expense of 
focusing on the local elements (for a review, see Changizi, Hsieh, Nijhawan, Kanai, & 
Shimojo, 2008). While individuals with ASD are far less affected by such visual 
configurations (e.g., Brosnan Scott, Fox, & Pye, 2004), important context effects are apparent. 
For example, participants with ASD were found to be more susceptible to Muller-Lyer 
illusions when asked, “which line looks longer,” versus “which line is longer” (Scott, 
Brosnan, & Wheelwright, in preparation, as cited in Happé & Frith, 2006). It appears that 
individuals with ASD can see both that the lines are equally long, and that the lines look like 
they differ in length.  
In sum, while individuals with ASD differ from typical development in the degree to which 
they focus on the higher-Gestalt of a pattern (vs. the local elements), this difference is 
susceptible to variations in task context. Findings reviewed here pertain to the domains of 
shifting attention from local elements to global patterns (and vice versa), face perception 
(which depends on detecting relations between facial parts), reading homographs (which 
require the entire sentence to be taken into account), and optical illusions (which depends 
on children failing to ignore the embedding aspects of the target). Such context effects on 
perception have led to some revisions in the ASD theory of weak central coherence (e.g. 
Happé & Booth, 2008). Rather than positing an all-or-none competence of Gestalt 
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processing, weak central coherence is now seen as a tendency, a preference of some sort that 
could be changed under ideal task contexts. 
3. Learning of patterns 
As mentioned above, ASD is characterized by delays in language learning, including the 
learning of new words, their use, the pragmatics of language, or the fluidity of use (see e.g., 
Lord, Risi, & Pickles, 2004, for a review). These delays, as well as other symptoms of autism, 
have been attributed to differences in how patterns of information are learned (e.g., L. G. 
Klinger, Klinger, & Pohlig, 2007). More specifically, individuals with autism might have 
difficulty learning underlying patterns of events when hypothesis-testing strategies cannot 
be applied. This kind of learning is commonly studied under the umbrella of implicit 
learning (see Perruchet, 2008; Shanks, 2005, for reviews), artificial-grammars learning (e.g., 
Reber, 1967), or pattern detection in category formation (e.g., Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Keri, 
2003). Here, we use the term “implicit learning”, consistent with the term used in ASD 
research.  
Studies of pattern learning have led to interesting findings in ASD. On the one hand, there 
are several findings that suggest impaired implicit learning in ASD (e.g., Romero-Munguía, 
2008). Consider, for example, findings obtained with the so-called serial reaction time (SRT) 
task: Participants are asked to press a key to indicate a particular stimulus in a sequence. 
Learning is reflected in a decrease in reaction time for sequences that contain subtle repeated 
patterns, compared to random sequences (cf., Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). While typically 
developing children demonstrated such learning, participants with ASD did not (Mostofsky, 
Goldberg, Landa, & Denckla, 2000). Further support for compromised implicit learning 
comes from findings on prototype learning (Klinger & Dawson, 2001). The task was to 
categorize fictitious animals that differed in features like ear length, leg length, and neck 
length (cf., Younger, 1993). Children with ASD performed more poorly than control 
participants match in verbal age (see also Klinger et al., 2007). In fact, performance on 
implicit learning tasks was highly correlated with ASD symptomatology, including 
communication skills, social skills, and the occurrence of repetitive behaviors. 
However, the difference in implicit-learning abilities between ASD and control participants 
is not stable across task context, even when tested in the same lab (cf., Klinger & Dawson 
2001; Klinger et al., 2001). Consider the SRT task again: when the inter-stimulus interval was 
reduced to 120ms (Barnes, Howard, Howard, Gilotty, Kenworthy, Gaillard 2008) or omitted 
altogether (Travers, Klinger, Mussey, & Klinger 2010), there was no difference between ASD 
and control participants. Both groups of children could learn to anticipate the rule-based 
sequence, compared to a random sequence (see also Muller, Cauich, Rubio, Mizuno, & 
Couchesne, 2004). Similarly, there was evidence for sequence learning when the rule was 
greatly simplified and the training extended to multiple sessions (Gordon & Stark, 2007). 
Furthermore, children with ASD demonstrate repetition priming effects comparable to those 
of controls (i.e., they could identify studies items better than non-studied items; Renner, 
Klinger, & Renner, 2000). And they were found to have intact semantic priming for simple 
common words (Toichi & Kamio, 2002) – further evidence for implicit-learning abilities in 
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ASD. Overall, these findings have undermined a claim that ASD is characterized by a 
general difficulty with implicit learning, in turn undermining an effort to explain social 
deficits, motor abnormalities, and language deficits associated with the disorder.  
There are many ways in which context effects on implicit learning could be explained. For 
example, one could address the differences in findings by looking for differences in the groups 
of participants, whether in age, symtomatology, or co-morbidity. It is possible that the findings 
fail to univocally address the question of implicit-learning competence in ASD because 
participants differ across different tasks. Or one could look for differences in other internal 
processes that could explain the pattern of performance. Tasks might differ in the degree to 
which they tap a participant’s working memory. Or they differ in the extent to which they 
require the integration of gross-motor movements. Or they differ in whether they afford or 
undermine the use of explicit (i.e., hypothesis-testing) strategies. Indeed, ASD performance is 
comparable to that of typically developing children when the prototype learning task required 
a rule-based approach (Klinger & Dawson, 2001). And an exceedingly short inter-stimulus 
interval might have forced the minds of participants with ASD to abandon their bias to use a 
hypothesis-testing strategy and therefore make room for an implicit-learning process. There 
are multiple problems with this kind of reasoning, a major one being that it fails to address the 
entire list of context effects – beyond a comparison of a few studies. 
4. Executive functioning 
Executive functioning (EF) is an umbrella term to describe various cognitive abilities 
assumed to be involved in conscious problem-solving. They pertain, for example, to 
inhibiting incorrect but dominant actions, planning a future action, and flexibly switching 
attention when instructed to do so (e.g., Zelazo & Mϋeller, 2002). EF plays an important role 
in cognitive development, as it leads to an improved ability to override automatic responses 
(Garon, Bryson, & Smith, 2008). A classical EF task – but by far not the only one – is the 
Stroop task, a task in which participants are asked to name the color of the ink used for a 
printed word, the word spelling a particular color (Stroop, 1935). The central finding is a 
slowing in reaction time when the ink color differs from the spelled-out color (compared to 
trials in which the ink color matches the spelled-out color), demonstrating the difficulty of 
inhibiting the automatic tendency to read the word. 
EF is thought to be associated with typical ASD attributes, including the need for sameness, 
difficulty with switching attention, a tendency to perseverate, and a lack of impulse control. 
Indeed, there are tasks in which participants with ASD show difficulty with inhibition (for a 
review see Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007). Consider, for example, an inhibition task in which 
participants have to point to an empty window in order to receive the reward shown in a 
non-empty window (Hala, & Russel 2001). Unlike control participants, a majority of 
participants with ASD have difficulty inhibiting their natural response of pointing to the 
reward they desire, compared to controls matched on mental age. Other examples of EF 
difficulties consist of difficulties with planning (e.g., (Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999, Ozonoff, 
Pennington, & Rogers, 1991), mental flexibility (e.g.,  Hughes, Russell,  & Robbins, 1994; 
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Ozonoff, 1997), the generation of novel ideas (Turner, 1999), and self-monitoring (e.g., 
Hughes, 1996; Phillips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter 1998; Russell & Jarrold, 1998, 1999).   
However, there are findings that undermine a straightforward ASD theory surrounding EF 
differences. For example, participants with ASD do not have more difficulty with the Stroop 
task than control participants (e.g., Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999; Eskes, Bryson, & McCormick, 
1990): participants with ASD were found to show a typical slowing in reaction time when 
naming the ink of a word that spells a different color. Similarly, context effects were found 
with planning task that involves keeping in mind a certain set of rules to produce an 
outcome (e.g., Tower of Hanoi task, Stockings of Cambridge task). ASD performance was 
equivalent to typically developing performance on trials with only a small number of 
required steps for completion. Performance only differentiated between groups on longer, 
more complex trials. Further, performance appeared modulated by each individual child’s 
nonverbal IQ, rather than symptomology (Hughes, Russell, & Robbins, 1994).   
It appears that a claim about EF differences between typical development and ASD is not 
supported in all instances (for further review, see Hill, 2004). Performance seems instead 
dependent on specifics of the tasks and individual differences among children. Of course, it 
is always possible to interpret discrepant results consistent with a reductionist viewpoint. 
For example, one could argue that EF differences between typical and atypical development 
are most pronounced in so-called “hot” EF task, those that involve an emotional component 
(cf., Hongwanishkul, Happaney, Lee, & Zelazo, 2005). The differences might disappear in 
“cool” EF tasks, those that lack immediate rewards. These claims, though plausibly 
incorporating currently existing data, might not be able to capture context effects likely to 
accumulate as more data is being collected.  
5. Social reasoning 
Adaptive functioning includes social reasoning, or a child’s ability to engage in social 
interactions. ASD is characterized by major difficulties in this domain, ranging from 
attending to irrelevant features of social situations (e.g., Dawson, Meltzoff, Osterling, 
Rinaldi, & Brown, 1998; Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar & Cohen 2002), giving atypical 
responses to social cues (e.g., Kjelgaard & Tager-Flusberg, 2001; Mottron, 2004; Mundy, 
Sigman & Kasari, 1990; Parish-Morris et al., 2007; Sigman & Ruskin, 1999; Stone, Ousley, 
Yoder, Hogan, & Hepburn 1997), having difficulty understanding the intentions of others 
(e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995; Preissler & Carey, 2005; Warreyn, Roeyers, Oelbrandt, & De 
Groote 2005), and poor imitation skills (e.g., Hobson & Lee, 1999; Loveland, Tunali-Kotoski, 
Pearson, Brelsford, Ortegon, & Chen 1994). Here we describe findings for two of these areas, 
namely joint attention (i.e., the act of sharing another’s attentional focus) and of theory of 
mind (i.e., the understanding of others’ intentions).   
5.1. Joint attention 
The ability to share somebody else’s focus of attention, known as joint attention, is critical 
for successful social interactions, setting up a context in which a child can learn from others. 
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For example, a child needs to know what a person is looking at to understand what a new 
label might refer to. Indeed, joint attention has been studied extensively in relation to 
children’s word learning (e.g., Baldwin, 1995; Mundy & Newell, 2007; Carpenter, Nagell, & 
Tomasello, 1998; Tomasello, 1995; see also Flom, Lee, & Muir, 2007). A common task 
involves presenting children with a set of objects, and an adult visibly looking at the one 
that is being named. Both the amount of time the participant follows the eye-gaze of the 
adult and the degree of labelling are thought to reflect the amount of joint attention that 
occurs between them.  
Children with ASD have demonstrated difficulty following the gaze of an adult in joint 
attention tasks (for a review, see Meindl & Cannella-Malone, 2011). And this deficit is 
observed alongside difficulties with learning new object names (Baron-Cohen, Baldwin, & 
Crowson, 1997; McDuffie, Yoder, & Stone, 2006; Parish-Morris, Hennon, Hirsh-Pasek, 
Golinkoff, & Tager-Flusberg, 2007; Preissler & Carey, 2005). For example, there is a 
pronounced learning difference between children with ASD and typically developing 
children when the labeled object was held by the experimenter, versus by the child (Preissler 
& Carey, 2005). This difference cannot be attributed to general word-learning deficits 
because word learning did not differ between diagnostic groups when the labeled object 
was in the child’s hand. Similarly, learning did not differ between diagnostic groups when 
the labeled object was the only novel object.  
Yet, despite strong evidence in favor of ASD impairments in joint attention, findings from 
other research complicate the picture: participants with ASD appear perfectly capable of 
joint attention in some contexts, if not even more skilled than their typically developing 
counterparts (Chawarska, Klin, Volkmar 2003; Kylliainen & Hietanen, 2004; Vlamings, 
Strauder, van Son, Mottron 2005). Consider, for example, a task in which participants have 
to press a corresponding button as soon as they see a target appear either at the top left or 
the bottom right of a monitor. A face was also shown in the center of the monitor. The gaze 
of the face was straight ahead, averted to the top left, or averted to the bottom right, 200ms 
before the target appeared. Findings show faster reaction time on trials in which the target 
appeared on the same side of the screen as the face’s gaze, with no difference between 
diagnostic groups (Kylliainen & Hietanen, 2004).  
An argument could be made that different joint-attention tasks are not equally suited to 
capture the construct of joint attention. Maybe the reaction time task is a better reflection of 
joint-attention processes than a word-learning task. Such argument about what task might best 
reflect a stable factor is a common argument in the larger literature of cognition and cognitive 
development. However, it gets quickly overwhelmed as more context effects accumulate. 
5.2. Theory of mind 
Another aspect of social reasoning is the ability to understand someone else’s mental state, 
including their desires, motivation or beliefs. This kind of understanding is coined as theory 
of mind, with numerous studies investigating it and its development (Perner, 1991; 
Wellman, 1990). In a traditional theory of mind task, children are presented with two hiding 
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locations, a basket and a box and two dolls, Sally and Anne. The story involves Sally placing 
a marble in a basket, which is then moved into the box by Anne – without Sally being 
present. The critical task is to determine the location where Sally would search for her 
marble upon her return. If children understand Sally’s mental state, they should pick the 
basket, because that is the marble’s location known to Sally. If, on the other hand, children 
go by their own beliefs, they should pick the box, because they know that Anne has moved 
the marble into the box.  
Many studies have sought to identify general deficits in theory of mind reasoning in 
individuals with ASD, as a means of better understanding their social deficits (for reviews 
see Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007). For example, Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) found that 80% of 
children with ASD failed the Sally-and-Anne test, compared to only 20% of matched 
controls. This difference cannot be attributed to general difficulties understanding the task 
instructions, given that children with ASD were able to answer control questions about the 
various locations of the marbles. Taken alone, these data appear to highlight a pathology 
specific impairment to theory of mind reasoning in individuals with ASD.  
However, highly variable performance between similar theory of mind tasks has been 
observed (Grant, Grayson and Boucher, 2001; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith 1985; Yirmiya, 
Solomonica-Levi, Shulman & Pilowsky, 1996; Zelazo, Burack, Benedetto, & Frye 1996). 
Consider, for example, findings with the so-called deceptive-box task, a task in which the 
content of a box does not match with the label on the box (Grant, Grayson & Boucher, 2001). 
After being shown the content of the box, participants are asked about what another 
participant would predict about the contents of the box (without having seen inside the 
box). To answer accurately, the participant must understand that their knowledge of the 
contents of the box is not accessible to the other participant. Comparison of performance on 
the deceptive-box and Sally-and-Anne tasks revealed important differences in ASD: 
Performance was better on the deceptive-box task than the Sally-and-Anne task, despite the 
conceptual similarity.  
In defense of a reductionist framework for ASD, one could go about dissecting the tasks in 
order to find the stable factor that could explain ASD. For example, one could argue that the 
two tasks differ in whether they involve real people (the deceptive box task) or puppets (the 
Salley-and-Anne task). Variable performance between these tasks may therefore reflect a 
difference in the perception of behavior associated with living versus inanimate actors. 
However, this explanation falls apart when the larger body of theory of mind research is 
considered: The inconsistent findings in theory of mind tasks (for a review, see Rajendran & 
Mitchell, 2007) to do separate on the fault line of inanimate vs. animate stimuli.   
6. Summary and conclusions 
ASD is diagnosed in about 1 in every 88 children (CDC, 2012), many of whom will have 
poor outcomes as adults, requiring some level of assistance throughout their lives (Seltzer, 
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Shattuck, & Greenberg, 2004). In addition to this high prevalence of the disorder, there is a 
high heterogeneity, high co-morbidity, and the possibility of several subgroups of ASD. 
Together, these factors make it imperative to better understand the disorder and develop 
effective interventions. However, as more research accumulates, so do inconsistent findings 
and unexpected differences in patterns of performance on tasks that were designed to 
measure the same cognitive process or factor.  
In the current chapter, we have reviewed some context effects taken from the domains of 
perception, learning, executive functioning, and social reasoning. On the one hand, while 
there are robust differences in performance in all of these domains, these differences can 
disappear under certain task contexts – rendering them less robust than initially thought. 
Specifically, while ASD is characterized by a focus on local details (vs. on an overall Gestalt), 
by difficulty with implicit learning, executive functioning, and social reasoning, these 
differences disappear as the variability in tasks increases. It is plausible that more context 
effects accumulate as ASD research expands in cognitive development, further exasperated 
by a focus on individual children.   
Context effects are nothing new in the literature of cognitive development (e.g., Kloos & Van 
Orden, 2009). A plausible reaction is to dismiss them as isolated instances, leaving an 
existing hypothesis intact, or refining it to incorporate the context effects. The problem, 
however, is that both these solutions can only address context effects locally. Yet, context 
effects are not a local phenomenon. And they are not likely to disappear with more 
participants, more precise methods, or simply more data. In fact, if research with typically 
developing participants is any guide for predicting the patterns of findings, context effects 
are a necessary feature of the enterprise. And with more research we are likely to find more 
context effects (e.g., see Shanks, Rowland & Ranger, 2005, for a discussion on implicit 
learning in neuro-typical adults). An expanding of a reductionist theory of ASD to 
incorporate them all is unlikely to retain its usefulness. Instead, context effects undermine a 
reductionist theory altogether. 
Rather than focusing on a binary interpretation of patterns of performance, context effects 
hint at the possibility of a complex interplay between factors that make a black-and-white 
approach to understanding performance insufficient. By shifting attention away from 
searching for a “smoking gun” of ASD, it may be possible to better understand the 
emergence of how the components are coordinated. It is possible that the coordination 
among components is compromised in individuals with ASD, reverberating through all 
areas of functioning, and amplifying itself with development. It gives rise to atypical 
perception patterns, implicit learning, planning, and social interactions – at least when the 
immediate task context does not support an adaptive coordination of interdependent 
components. This approach, while failing to reduce ASD to a single deficit, has important 
implications for training and teaching strategies. In particular, this approach makes it 
possible to map out how changes in support of coordination exist in the environment to 
bring about improved task performance.  
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